2 typically developing adults.
2 Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith write (2002, 727 ; my
It is often assumed that similar domain-specific behavioural impairments found in cases of adult brain damage and developmental disorders correspond to similar underlying causes, and can serve as convergent evidence for the modular structure of the normal adult cognitive system. We argue that this correspondence is contingent on an unsupported assumption that atypical development can produce selective deficits while the rest of the system develops normally (Residual Normality).
If correct, Karmiloff-Smith's argument would have significant implications. Most significantly perhaps, it would partly undermine one of the leading hypotheses about the nature of the typical cognitive architecture-evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis (see Section 1)-since the evidence for this hypothesis comes in part from findings about developmental psychopathologies. More generally, researchers working on the typical cognitive architecture would have to stop relying on an important source of evidence-viz. dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies.
In this chapter, I examine Karmiloff-Smith's argument in detail, and I argue that it is inconclusive. I conclude that it is possible to use the pattern of impaired and preserved capacities in people with developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I examine how developmental psychopathologies have been used to support hypotheses about the typical cognitive architecture, in particular the massive modularity hypothesis. In Section 2, I present Karmiloff-Smith's argument in detail ("Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument"). In Section 3, I show that Karmiloff-Smith's original formulation of this argument is 2 Karmiloff-Smith, 1998 Paterson, Brown, Gsdöl, Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, Brown, Grice, & Paterson, 2003 , Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif, & Ansari, 2003 Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2005; Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2005; Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006 . For further discussion of Karmiloff-Smith's work, see Gerrans, 2003; Faucher, 2006. 3 deficient, and I propose an improved argument ("Karmiloff-Smith's Improved Argument"). In Section 4, I show that even this improved argument is unsound. I conclude that dissociations resulting from developmental pathologies can be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture and to support the massive modularity hypothesis.
Before going any further, let me emphasize that the criticisms developed here
should not obfuscate the fact that there is much to admire in Karmiloff-Smith's research.
Although I will not elaborate on this point here, the integration of psychological, neuropsychological, developmental, and genetic perspectives on cognition strikes me as a model for psychology.
Psychopathologies and Cognitive Architecture

Cognitive Architecture
Describing the typical cognitive architecture of human beings consists in identifying the systems that make up the mind of typically developing individuals as well as the relations between these systems. One thereby assumes that the range of psychological capacities that are typical of human beings (e.g., producing a three-dimensional representation of the environment, evaluating the cardinality of visually perceived groups of objects or sequences of sounds, drawing an inductive inference on the basis of incomplete information, evaluating the moral value of an action, action planning, etc.) are the result of several distinct systems rather than being the product of a single cognitive system.
This may sound like an innocuous assumption nowadays, but it has not always been so (see, e.g., the discussion of Pierre-Marie Flourens and Karl Lashley in Wright & Bechtel, 2007) .
The systems that make up the typical cognitive architecture are characterized functionally-that is, they are characterized by their outcome and by the series of operations involved in bringing about this outcome. It is thus not assumed that the components of the typical cognitive architecture are necessarily located in distinct brain areas. Two distinct systems could (but, of course, need not) be located in the same brain area. Similarly, all-in-one printers can print, scan, and fax documents. From a functional point of view, they are made up of three distinct systems, which happen to be located in the same physical object.
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Controversies about the nature of the typical cognitive architecture abound.
Hypotheses vary along several dimensions, three of which are important for present purposes:
-Sparseness: How many systems constitute the typical cognitive architecture?
-Encapsulation: Is the functioning of each system influenced by many other systems?
-Evolution: Are the systems that constitute the typical cognitive architecture adaptations?
A hypothesized cognitive architecture is sparser than another (which is more florid)
when it is made up of fewer systems. 4 Hypotheses that postulate sparse cognitive architectures suppose that some hypothesized component systems can underwrite several competences that are characteristic of human cognition. Such systems are often said to be domain-general, and they stand in contrast with domain-specific systems. 5 A system is more encapsulated than another when its functioning is influenced by a smaller number of other systems. 6 Finally, a system is an adaptation if it has been selected for at some point in the past. Adaptations need not be adaptive in modern environments, and, in modern environments, they need not bring about what they evolved to do (see, e.g., the ethnic cognitive system discussed in Gil-White, 2001 and Faucher, 2005) .
The Massive Modularity Hypothesis
3 The systems that constitute the typical cognitive architecture (e.g., the human visual system) can themselves be decomposed. 4 One might worry that the sparseness of a cognitive architecture depends on the level of description of this cognitive architecture. This worry is circumvented when one notes that for a given set of functions it is a matter of fact whether the architecture is sparse or florid. 5 The notions of domain-specificity and domain-generality are thus comparative.
6 Encapsulation is also a comparative notion.
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Evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis is one of the most influential hypotheses about human cognitive architecture. Because the notion of modularity has been understood in various ways, it is useful to clarify the massive modularity hypothesis. 7 The hypothesis proposes that the typical cognitive architecture consists of numerous systems, most of which are adaptations selected for specific purposes. Thus, evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis hypothesizes a florid cognitive architecture. In addition, the systems that make up the typical cognitive architecture are adaptations. Noteworthily, the massive modularity hypothesis, as understood here, does not propose that systems are encapsulated: Some might be encapsulated, but others might not, depending on whether encapsulation allowed them to bring about the function for which they were selected.
The characterization of the massive modularity hypothesis proposed here sharply contrasts with Karmiloff-Smith's curious characterization (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998 Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2005) . According to Karmiloff-Smith, evolutionary psychologists contend that infants are born with the set of systems that constitute the typical cognitive architecture-an extreme form of preformationism! However, evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis says in fact nothing about the developmental schedule of the adaptations that constitute the evolved typical cognitive architecture. Some psychological adaptations might be present at birth, while others might develop later during development, depending (among other things) on whether it was adaptive to have these adaptations at birth. In addition, while some evolutionary psychologists, such as Steven Pinker (e.g., 1997) , have claimed that the development of psychological adaptations is genetically determined (whatever that means), the massive modularity hypothesis is consistent with Karmiloff-Smith's insistence that psychological development involves a complex interaction between the environment in which the child develops and his or her genome. The reason is simply that there are numerous ways for an adaptation to develop and that adaptations often develop by relying on the regularities 7 For other interpretations, see Samuels, 2005; Carruthers, 2006 . See Barrett & Kurzban, 2006 Machery & Barrett, 2006 in support of the claim that the account proposed here is the relevant way to cash out evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis.
6 present in the environment (for a systematic development of this perspective, see Sterelny, 2003) . So, Karmiloff-Smith's construal of modularity is erroneous. Note importantly that this does not invalidate her argument against the use of developmental psychopathologies to support the massive modularity hypothesis, since, as we shall see in Section 2, this argument does not depend at all on her peculiar characterization of this hypothesis.
The Role of Dissociations in the Decomposition of the Mind
Dissociations are the main source of evidence for decomposing the mind in cognitive science. 8 It is common to distinguish the dissociations found in behavioral psychology, which are sometimes called "functional dissociation" (e.g., Dunn & Kirsner, 1988 from the dissociations found in neuropsychology. I will do the same here although the rationale for using these two types of dissociations to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture is basically identical.
In experimental psychology, a single dissociation is found when and only when a variable affects differently participants' performance in two different tasks. Suppose that participants are asked to reason about deontic conditionals, such as "If you want to drink in the USA, you should be over 21" (task 1), or about non-deontic indicative conditionals, such as "If you want to go from JFK to the Manhattan, you take the line E" (task 2). Suppose now that you ask participants to do both tasks while reading silently the numbers that defile on the screen (a manipulation known as "cognitive load" in psychology). You would have a single dissociation if you find an interaction: The difference between participants' performance in task 2 with and without cognitive load would be larger than the difference between participants' performance in task 1 with and without cognitive load. According to this definition, a variable might affect participants' performance in both tasks, but a dissociation has been found if it affects their performance differently. The expressions "weak dissociation" or "impure dissociation"
are sometimes used to refer to this situation. A stricter definition (e.g., Dunn & Kirsner 8 There are several, cross-cutting classifications of dissociations (Dunn & Kirsner 1988 Shallice, 1988) . 7 2003) would be that a single dissociation is found when and only when performance in one task is not affected, while performance in the other task is affected. The expressions "strong dissociation" or "pure dissociation" are sometimes used to refer to this situation.
In a double dissociation, two variables affect differently participants' performance in two tasks ("impure double dissociation"). According to a stricter definition, a first variable affects participants' performance in a first task, but not in a second task, while a second variable affects participants' performance in the latter task, but not in the former ("pure double dissociation").
In substance, dissociations in neuropsychology are similar to dissociations in experimental psychology, except for the fact that the manipulated variable that affects participants' performance is either a brain lesion or an atypical developmental pattern.
Thus, one speaks of a single dissociation when a single brain lesion or a single atypical developmental pattern (due, e.g., to a genetic disorder) affects differently participants' performance in two different tasks, by comparison to a control group of unlesioned or typically developing controls. For instance, the study of patient HM has shown that an injury to the hippocampus leads to the loss of the anterograde, long-term, explicit memory, but not to the loss of working memory or implicit memory (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968) . In some cases, the lesion or the atypical development might entirely knock off people's capacity to fulfill one of these tasks ("pure single dissociation"). A pure double dissociation happens when a brain lesion or a particular atypical developmental pattern affects the performance of a first group of patients in a first task, but not in a second task, while another brain lesion affects the performance of a second group of patients in a second task, but not in a first task, by comparison to a control group of unimpaired patients. A double dissociation in neuropsychology can also be impure. Rather, as Karmiloff-Smith seems to do (e.g., Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002, 729) , I
will take for granted that at least some dissociations can be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture and to support evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis, and I will focus on whether the dissociations that result from abnormal neural and cognitive development can be used for this purpose.
The Role of Developmental Psychopathologies
Developmental psychopathologies can support the massive modularity hypothesis in two different respects (see, e.g., Duchaine, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2001 10 Teuber, 1955; Caramazza, 1986; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988 Shallice, 1988; Glymour, 1994; Plaut, 1995; Young, Hilgetag, & Scannell, 2000; Van Orden, Pennington, & Stone, 2001; Ashby & Ell, 2002; Machery, 2009, chapter on the basis of evolutionary considerations, one could then argue that the fact that a system fulfills exclusively one of these functions is evidence that it is designed to fulfill it, and this would be evidence that it is an adaptation (Machery, Forthcoming) . Now, of course, this is not tantamount to saying that the existence of systems fulfilling evolutionary relevant functions would be strong evidence in support of the massive modularity hypothesis. Evidence about whether the system fulfills its function in an optimal or at least in an efficient manner would be stronger evidence. In addition, this kind of arguments are controversial (Richardson, 2007) , and their evidentiary strength is in any case weaker than other kinds of evidence that can be used to support adaptationist hypotheses, such as cross-species comparisons. Still, evidence they do provide.
Let's consider an example of the use of a developmental psychopathology in support of the massive modularity hypothesis. Clahsen and Almazan (1998) have argued that the pattern of preserved and impaired linguistic capacities found in people with
Williams syndrome provides evidence about the typical cognitive architecture of the linguistic capacity (see also Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994 ). When completing a task involves applying some syntactic or morphosynctactic rules (according to the generativegrammar framework endorsed by Clahsen and Almazan), the four teenagers with Williams syndrome they examined did equally well, if not better, than children matched for mental age and participants with Specific Language Impairment. For instance, participants with Williams syndrome appeared to comply with principles A, B, and C of government and binding theory: They seemed to know, for instance, that referring expressions, such as proper names, cannot be bound by referring expressions that ccommand them (Principle C). Similarly, they formed appropriately the past tense of regular verbs and of novel verbs whose phonology is different from known irregular verbs' phonology. By contrast, when completing a task involved retrieving some specific components of the lexical entry associated with a lexeme, participants with Williams syndrome did less well than children matched for mental age and than subjects with Specific Language Impairment. For instance, they overgeneralized the rule for forming a past tense to novel verbs whose phonology is similar to known irregular verbs' phonology, while control children and participants with Specific Language Impairment formed the past tense of these verbs by analogy with the past tense of these known irregular verbs. Clahsen and Almazan conclude (1998, 192) :
From the perspective of modular linguistic theory, selective impairments such as those found in WS receive a straightforward interpretation.
Adding (1998, 193) :
The common property shared by the unimpaired linguistic phenomena is that they involve computational knowledge of language, whereas the impaired phenomena involve (specific kinds of) lexical knowledge, i.e. the retrieval of subnode information from lexical entries. Thus, it seems that WS children's computational system for language is selectively spared yielding excellent performance on syntactic tasks and on regular inflection, whereas the lexical system and/or its access mechanisms required for irregular inflection are impaired. 
Why Developmental Psychopathologies Provide No Evidence for Modularity
Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument
Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues have challenged the use of developmental disorders to support the massive modularity hypothesis and, more broadly, to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture. Karmiloff-Smith and Thomas write (2005, 307) :
In this chapter, we discuss why it is essential to take a neuroconstructivist approach to interpreting the data from developmental disorders and why these latter cannot be used to bolster evolutionary nativist claims. From our studies of older children and adults with the neurodevelopmental disorder, Williams syndrome, we show how processes that some claim to be "intact" actually display subtle impairments and cannot serve to divide the cognitive system into parts that 2. The residual normality assumption is false: Because the abnormal mind develops abnormally, it is made of cognitive systems that differ from the systems making up the typical architecture.
3. Hence, one cannot use developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
Let me first say a few words about the conclusion of this argument. In contrast to other arguments against the massive modularity hypothesis, Karmiloff-Smith's Original
Argument does not attempt to show that this hypothesis is false or confused. It does not provide evidence that the typical cognitive architecture is sparse or that its components are not adaptations (as, e.g., Quartz, 2002 and Buller, 2005 do) . 12 Nor does it attempt to show that this hypothesis is unclear (as, e.g., Woodward & Cowie, 2004 do) . Rather, Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument supports a methodological conclusion. The point of her argument is not that the massive modularity hypothesis is false, but that, common wisdom notwithstanding, developmental psychopathologies provide no support for it.
Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument undermines one of the sources of evidence evolutionary psychologists and, more generally, cognitive scientists have relied on to determine the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
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I now turn to Premise 1. Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues propose a necessary condition for the use of developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture: Developmental psychopathologies can be used for this purpose only if they impair a particular cognitive system (e.g., the system underlying face recognition, numerical cognition, or the formation of irregular past tenses in English, etc.), while leaving the other systems intact. Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues call the hypothesis that developmental psychopathologies result in an impaired system while leaving the other systems intact "the subtractivity or residual normality assumption" (Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006) . 13 Because Karmiloff-Smith proposes that developmental psychopathologies can be used to distinguish cognitive systems only if the residual normality assumption is true, developmental psychopathologies provide evidence for the existence of distinct cognitive systems only if they result in pure dissociations (Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006 ).
Let's now turn to Premise 2. Premise 2 asserts that as a matter of fact, the necessary condition for the use of developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture is not met. It is never the case that developmental psychopathologies result in an impaired cognitive system, while the other systems are intact. It would not be sufficient for Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument to merely assert that typically, developmental psychopathologies do not impair a single cognitive system, while leaving the other systems intact. Finding a few cases where a developmental psychopathology results in such a selective impairment would be sufficient to allow the use of developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture, even if one were to grant KarmiloffSmith's Premise 1. Certainly, developmental psychopathologies would then rarely be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture and to support the massive modularity hypothesis, but, in principle, they could be used for this purpose.
Why do Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues believe that the necessary condition expressed by Premise 1 (residual normality) is never met? They support this premise by 13 This assumption was called "subtractivity" in Saffran (1982) and "transparency" in Caramazza (1984 Because the brain develops as a whole system from embryogenesis onwards, we believe it to be highly unlikely that children with genetic disorders will end up with a patchwork of neatly segregated, preserved and impaired cognitive modules.
Adding (2005, 312):
People with genetic disorders do not, in our view, have normal brains with parts preserved and parts impaired. Rather, they have developed an atypical brain throughout embryogenesis and subsequent postnatal growth, so we should expect fairly widespread impairments across the brain rather than a very localised one.
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Face Recognition in Williams Syndrome
In addition to appealing to their holistic views about brain development, Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues argue that the empirical work on a large number of developmental psychopathologies inductively supports Premise 2 of Karmiloff-Smith's Original
Argument. For the sake of space, I will focus on Williams syndrome. Williams syndrome is a rare neurological disorder with a well studied genetic etiology (Donnai & KarmiloffSmith, 2000; Karmiloff-Smith, 2007; Martens, Wilson, & Reutens, 2008) . This syndrome is characterized by a distinctive pattern of severely impaired capacities that co-exist with apparently preserved capacities. Specifically, while spatial cognition is severely impaired among people with Williams syndrome, other psychological competences such as face recognition and syntactic processing are apparently preserved (Bellugi, Sabo, & Vaid, 1988 , Bellugi et al.,1994 . People with Williams syndrome perform within the normal range on many tasks meant to evaluate people's syntactic competence and people's face recognition capacity (e.g., the Benton Facial Recognition Task and the Rivermead Face Memory Task).
Because Williams syndrome appears to be characterized by a pattern of intact and impaired capacities, it has often been adduced as evidence for the existence of distinct cognitive systems. Thus, Bellugi and colleagues (1988) argued that prosopagnosia caused by brain traumas and Williams syndrome resulted in a double dissociation, providing evidence that face recognition is underwritten by a dedicated cognitive system, while Pinker (1999) used Williams syndrome to argue for the separability of language and intelligence. As we saw earlier, Clahsen and Almazan (1998) 14 In addition to the facial features themselves (e.g., a nose of a particular shape), the spatial configuration of these features is used to recognize faces.
The importance of this spatial configuration for face recognition is illustrated by the wellknown face-inversion effect: It is difficult to decide whether a picture of a face is identical to or different from an inverted picture because the configural information is not available in inverted faces (e.g., Yin, 1969; Valentine, 1988 We are then inclined to suggest that the WS subjects were less disturbed than the control subjects by the change of face orientation because they are incapable of encoding faces in terms of configural information and encode both upright and inverted faces through local characteristics.
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In addition to this processing difference, electrophysiological differences in brain activation during face processing by people with Williams syndrome and by comparison participants have also been reported. In Mills et al. (2000) , participants were asked to decide whether the second picture of a pair of sequentially presented face pictures was the same as the first picture. It was found that the event-related potentials (ERP) waveform elicited by face recognition differs in controls and participants with Williams syndrome. In controls, there is a clear difference in the ERP waveform between upright and inverted faces. In addition, the waveform is asymmetric for upright faces, with the right hemisphere being more strongly activated. By contrast, participants with Williams syndrome's ERP waveform did not show any difference between upright and inverted faces nor did they display an hemispherical asymmetry.
Although this study is often cited uncritically, it should be noted that it does not clearly support Karmiloff-Smith's claim about processing differences in people with
Williams syndrome and typically developing participants. Mills and colleagues found that participants with Williams syndrome displayed an inversion effect, a hallmark for the use of configural cues to identify faces. This seems to suggest that the electrophysiological differences in brain activation might not be related to the hypothesized difference between face processing in typically developing individuals and in people with Williams syndrome. Similarly, Mills and colleagues note that children do not show the ERP waveform typically elicited by face recognition in typically developing adults. The problem is that children are known to use most types of configural cues in face recognition (Maurer et al., 2002) . Again, this suggests that these electrophysiological differences might be unrelated to the processing or absence of processing of configural cues.
Be it as it may, Karmiloff-Smith and Thomas summarize their work on face recognition in people with Williams syndrome as follows (2005, 314):
In sum, people with WS do not present with a normally developed "intact" face processing module and an impaired space processing module, as nativists would claim. Rather, from the outset they have followed an atypical developmental trajectory such that both facial and spatial processing reveal a similar underlying impairment in configural processing. It is simply because the problem space of face processing lends itself more readily to featural analysis than spatial analysis does, so that it merely seems normal in the older child and adult.
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In what follows, I will take for granted the claim that people with Williams syndrome have difficulty using configural cues, even though, as noted earlier, some articles report the existence of an inversion effect in people with Williams syndrome (e.g., Mills et al., 2000) . 16 It is noteworthy that this idea was already discussed in the early 1990s (Bellugi et al., 1994 Developmental psychopathologies do not leave some systems intact, while impairing others. If it is also true that developmental psychopathologies can be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture and to support the massive modularity hypothesis only if the residual normality assumption is true, then Karmiloff-Smith is right to conclude that developmental psychopathologies provide no support whatsoever for the massive modularity hypothesis.
The Epistemology of Developmental Dissociations
In reply to Karmiloff-smith, some psychologists have argued that atypical developments due to psychopathologies do result in pure dissociations-thus granting Premise 1, but rejecting Premise 2 of Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument. Clahsen and colleagues provide a good example of this kind of reply (Clahsen, Ring, & Temple, 2004, 222) :
Evidence against subtractivity in linguistic domains would come from cases in which the underlying functional architecture of the language system itself had altered with the development of language modules that do not exist in the normal brain. However, there is no such empirical evidence in relation to language development in either adults or children.
In this section, I develop a different line of argument. I examine the two premises of Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument, and I argue that Premise 1 is erroneous, while Premise 2 is ambiguous. As a result, her argument cannot be accepted as it stands.
No Need for Pure Dissociations
As we saw in Section 2, Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues contend that developmental psychopathologies can be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture and, a fortiori, to support the massive modularity hypothesis only if developmental psychopathologies give rise to pure dissociations. I now argue that this claim is mistaken: Impure dissociations can also be used to support hypotheses about the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
The use of behavioral and neuropsychological dissociations for distinguishing processes rests on the following assumption: That the mind fulfills two distinct functions (e.g., reading regular words and irregular words) differently in two different conditions (e.g., under vs. without cognitive load or in controls vs. in people with Williams syndrome) is (non-conclusive) evidence that these two functions are fulfilled by two distinct systems (Section 1.3). Although this assumption is controversial, it has been taken for granted in this chapter because Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument does not hang on challenging it. This assumption entails that impure dissociations between two functions provide defeasible evidence that these functions are fulfilled by two distinct systems. If these two functions were fulfilled by a single system, then, plausibly (but not necessarily), they would be similarly affected by the characteristics of the second condition (e.g., cognitive load or atypical development due to Williams syndrome).
In the case of an impure dissociation, the more similar the fulfillment of function A is and the more different the fulfillment of function B is in conditions 1 and 2, the stronger the inference is that these two functions are fulfilled by two distinct systems.
One has only weak evidence that two functions are fulfilled by two distinct systems if while both functions are fulfilled differently in conditions 1 and 2, the difference between the fulfillment of functions A and B in condition 1 is similar to the difference between their fulfillment in condition 2-that is, if the difference between the two differences is small. One has stronger evidence if the difference between the two differences is large. In 20 this respect, a pure dissociation is merely a limiting case of an impure dissociation: The fulfillment of function A is identical in conditions 1 and 2, while function B is fulfilled differently in these two conditions.
The upshot is clear: Pace Karmiloff-Smith, it is not the case that dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies can be used only if the residual normality assumption is true: Premise 1 of Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument should be rejected. To grasp the distinction between these two readings, it might be useful to consider the following analogy. Suppose that the typically developing mind is like an all-in-one printer-a single physical object that fulfills several functions. According to the weak reading of Premise 2, the mind of an individual with Williams syndrome would be like an all-in-one printer that would consist of the same processes (for faxing, printing, and copying) as the typical all-in-one printer; however, these processes would be damaged to a smaller or greater extent: For instance, faxing might not work anymore, while printing and copying might work to some extent. By contrast, according to the strong reading of Premise 2, the mind of an individual with Williams syndrome would be like an all-in-one printer in which each function (faxing, printing, and copying) would be fulfilled by a sui generis process-a process that differs from the corresponding process in typical all-inone printers. This all-in-one printer would fulfill some of the functions that typical all-inone printers fulfill, but, as a consequence of its atypical developmental trajectory (so to speak!), it would fulfill them in its own way.
As we saw above, it is not the case that dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies can be used only if the residual normality assumption is true. Now, suppose that the weak reading of Premise 2 is true: Developmental psychopathologies such as Williams syndrome result in more or less impaired versions of the same systems that compose the typical cognitive architecture. Developmental psychopathologies would then result in impure dissociations, providing relevant evidence for identifying the components of the typical cognitive architecture and for evaluating the massive modularity hypothesis. Thus, the weak reading of Premise 2 fails to support Karmiloff-Smith's rejection of the evidential role of developmental psychopathologies.
By contrast, if the strong reading of Premise 2 is true (that is, if developmental psychopathologies result in systems that differ from the systems making up the typical cognitive architecture), the dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies would be of no use for identifying the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
The reason is simple: The impure dissociations caused by these psychopathologies would not result from greater or smaller impairments of the processes that make up the typical cognitive architecture, but from the greater or smaller efficiency of sui generis processes.
As a result, Karmiloff-Smith would be right to reject the evidential role of developmental psychopathologies.
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Consider again the analogy between the mind and an all-in-one printer. If the strong reading of Premise 2 is correct, the mind of an individual with Williams syndrome is like an all-in-one printer that consists of sui generis processes. Now, because the processes that make up this all-in-one printer are sui generis, it is impossible to draw any conclusion about the processes that make up a typical all-in-one printer from the structure of this atypical printer. For instance, the fact that printing and copying are fulfilled by two distinct processes in the atypical all-in-one printer provides no evidence about whether these two functions are also fulfilled by two distinct processes in typical printers.
Reformulating Karmiloff-Smith's Original Argument
Because only the strong reading of Premise 2 supports Karmiloff-Smith's intended conclusion, it is necessary to reformulate her argument. This can be done as follows:
Karmiloff-Smith's Improved Argument 1. Pure and impure dissociations can be used to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture only if they result from (perhaps damaged to a smaller or a greater extent) the very systems that make up the typical cognitive architecture.
2. Developmental psychopathologies result in systems that differ in kind from the systems making up the typical cognitive architecture (strong reading of Premise 2).
3. Hence, it is not possible to use developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture.
A Difficulty
Before examining the empirical support for the strong reading of Premise 2, I should acknowledge that the distinction between the two readings of Premise 2 supposes that one can set apart the following two cases:
Individuation Distinction -Two token systems (in two persons) are instances of two different types of system.
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-Two token systems (in two persons) are instances of the same type of systems, but one of them processes information atypically.
Earlier, I contrasted the case where an all-in-one printer includes a different system for printing from the typical printer and the case where an all-in-one printer includes a damaged version of the typical system for printing. Thereby, I assumed that the distinction at hand could be drawn for printing systems. When it comes to cognitive systems, this distinction turns out to difficult to draw, since there are no agreed-upon individuation criteria for cognitive systems (Machery, 2009, chapter 5) . The lack of such criteria might look like an insuperable difficulty for the argumentative strategy followed
here, but it should be kept in mind that Karmiloff-Smith's argument against the use of dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies also relies on such a distinction (see Premise 2 of Karmiloff-Smith's Improved Argument).
How can the Individuation Distinction be drawn? Suppose that in a typical cognitive architecture, doing A (e.g., identifying someone's gender) can be done on the basis of various probabilistic cues, x, y, or z (shape of the face, pilosity, etc.). Suppose now that someone is able to do A, but only imperfectly: She cannot use some of the cues used by controls (say, she cannot use x). As a result, she tends to be less reliable than controls, and she might be unable to do A when using x is crucial for doing A. Now, I
propose that the more cues she can use to do A (among the cues used by a control), the more likely it is that her system for doing A is a damaged version of the typical system for doing A rather than an altogether different system. The rationale for this proposal is that if the system for doing A were an instance of a different type of system (rather than a damaged version of a typical system), the fact that it would use many of the cues used by a typical system would be puzzling. I also propose that it would be strong evidence that her system for doing A would be of a different type if she used cues that controls do not use.
Note that these proposals are not meant to define what having two token systems of the same type consists in. It is conceivable that two different token systems (one of which is a typical system) might be of the same type (the atypical system being a damaged version of the typical system), although the atypical system uses very few of the cues used by the typical system because it is a very damaged system. Rather, these 24 proposals are meant to characterize the evidence one can defeasibly use to decide whether two token systems are of the same type.
Evaluation of the Strong Reading of Premise 2
Karmiloff-Smith's Theoretical Argument in Support of Premise 2
Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues support Premise 2 of her original argument by two types of consideration: (1) plausible theoretical considerations about brain development and (2) empirical evidence about the pervasiveness of the impairments resulting from developmental psychopathologies. I now argue that the theoretical considerations adduced by Karmiloff-Smith provide no support for either the weak or the strong reading of Premise 2 and thus cannot be used to support the improved argument presented at the end of Section 3.
Karmiloff-Smith's point about brain development is simple. Brain development in infancy and early childhood is holistic: Brain areas are massively interconnected, so that developmental changes in one of these areas have consequences in numerous other areas.
As a result, even minor developmental brain problems have cascading effects, which affect the development of the whole brain and of all cognitive capacities.
This argument might seem plausible, but it carries in fact little weight. The reason is that Karmiloff-Smith's description of brain development is at odds with an important feature of biological development-viz. its modularity (e.g., Schlosser & Wagner, 2004) .
In the context of developmental biology, "modularity" refers to the property that the developmental pathway leading to the development of a trait is shielded from the changes that might happen to other developmental pathways. Karmiloff-Smith's argument in support of Premise 2 amounts to denying that this typical feature of biological development also applies to brain development. But because biological development is typically modular, it would be surprising if brain development was not modular to some degree too. We should thus refrain from putting too much weight on Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues' theoretical considerations about brain development. Thus, neither the strong nor the weak reading of Premise 2 are clearly supported by these considerations.
Consequently, the plausibility of the strong reading of Premise 2 (the reading KarmiloffSmith needs, as argued in Section 3) hangs on the empirical evidence drawn from her 25 research on Williams syndrome and other developmental psychopathologies. I discuss the significance of this research in the remainder of this section.
What is the Nature of Williams Syndrome's Face Processing Impairment?
I now argue that the evidence about face recognition suggests that the face recognition system in people with Williams syndrome is a damaged version of the typical system for face recognition rather than a system of a different type. If this is correct, KarmiloffSmith's work on face recognition in Williams syndrome provides no support for the strong reading of Premise 2. 19 Given that this strong reading is not supported either by her theoretical considerations about brain development, we have little reason to believe that developmental psychopathologies result in a cognitive architecture made up of altogether different systems rather than in a cognitive architecture made up of more or less damaged versions of the cognitive systems that compose the typical cognitive architecture. As a result, the impure dissociations that result from developmental psychopathologies can be used as evidence about the typical cognitive architecture.
The face recognition system in people with Williams syndrome is a damaged version of the typical system for face recognition because people with Williams syndrome use many of the cues used by typically developing individuals to identify faces and because they do not seem to use cues that are not used by typically developing individuals. Three kinds of cues are commonly distinguished in the literature: individual facial features (e.g., a nose of a particular shape), the holistic relation between cues, and the configuration of cues (but see Maurer et al., 2002 for further distinctions). While the distinction between the first kind of cues and the two other kinds of cues is clear, the distinction between holistic and configural cues is unclear. Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004 , 1259 contend that "the term 'holistic' is deemed to cover the gluing together of facial features (and hairline) into a gestalt, without necessarily conserving the spatial distances between features," while a cue is configural if it is constituted by the spatial distances between features. Thus, Karmiloff-Smith and 19 Research on syntactic processing would support a similar conclusion (Clahsen & Temple, 2003) .
colleagues seem to have in mind the following distinction. An isosceles triangle constituted by a pair of specific eyes and a nose would be a holistic cue since it is not constituted by the specific distances between the center of the eyes and between the eyes and the tip of the nose. By contrast, an isosceles triangle that is constituted by a pair of specific eyes and a nose, whose base is 71 millimeters and whose altitude is 41 millimeters would be a configural cue. It is worth noting that holistic and configural cues do not really form two distinct kinds of cues; rather, they are the limits of a continuum.
Between the two cues just described, one finds a range of cues that specify the distances between specific features to some degree of precision. An isosceles triangle that is constituted by a pair of specific eyes and a nose, whose base is between 68 and 71 millimeters and whose altitude is between 37 and 41 millimeters would be such an intermediary cue. But because nothing hangs on identifying a continuum rather than two kinds of cues in what follows, I will take for granted the distinction between the three types of cues proposed by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues. asked participants with Williams syndrome and controls to complete a part-whole task. In the whole-face condition, participants are presented with pictures of faces, before being asked to decide which of two pictures they were presented with (the distractor picture differs only by one feature). In the isolated-part condition, participants are presented with 20 To express this proposition in terms of a continuum of cues, one would say that people with Williams syndrome can use holistic cues when the spatial distances are not specified in detail, but not when they are specified in detail. 21 Their work is not formulated in terms of holistic versus configural cues, since this distinction was developed by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues (2004) in response to Tager-Flusberg and colleagues (2003) .
pictures of faces, before being asked which of two features (e.g., which of two noses) they were presented with. Half of the stimuli are presented upright, while half of the stimuli are inverted. It was found that although participants with Williams syndrome do overall less well than control participants, the two groups answer similarly. Particularly, "both groups were more accurate in the whole-face than in the isolated-part test condition for upright faces, but not for inverted faces" (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2003, 18 Williams syndrome acquire an impaired or a preserved system for face recognition and, if it is impaired, whether it is a damaged version of the typical face recognition or a system that is altogether different. And the abnormality of the development of a cognitive system is weak evidence that the developing system is abnormal, since biological development is often robust: There are often several developmental pathways to the same endpoint.
Thus, even if Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues are right that face processing develops differently in people with Williams syndrome and typically developing people, it could still be that their developmental trajectories lead to the same endpoint.
22 This is not to say that the developmental trajectory of face processing in people with Williams syndrome is unimportant or uninteresting.
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Second, Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003) and Karmiloff-Smith et al. (2004) seem to concur that people with Williams syndrome can use two of the three types of cues that typically developing individuals use. Given our discussion of system individuation above, this suggests that face recognition in Williams syndrome is underwritten by a moderately damaged version of the typical system for face recognition rather than by an altogether different system. The strong reading of Premise 2 is thus not supported, and KarmiloffSmith Improved Argument fails.
At this point, Karmiloff-Smith could make one of the following two replies. She could appeal to the finding that the neural basis of face processing differs in typically developing individuals and in people with Asperger syndrome (Mills et al., 2000) . She would then argue that because brain areas involved in face processing in people with
Williams syndrome and in typically developing individuals are different, face processing is likely to be underwritten by two different systems (Ashby and Ell, 2002; 2009, chapter 5).
There are two rejoinders to this first reply. First, as noted in Section 2, Mills et al.'s (2000) study does not support Karmiloff-Smith's claim unambiguously. Second, additional research has shown that face processing activates the right fusiform gyrus in both controls and typically developing people. Mobbs et al. (2004) asked participants to identify gaze direction for four types of faces (depending on whether the face and the gaze direction were angled 45° or not). Although differences in brain activation were found between the two groups of participants, it was also found that the right fusiform gyrus was activated both in people with Williams syndrome and in controls. The extent to which the neural basis of face processing differs in people with Williams syndrome and in typically developing individuals is thus unclear, and differences might well be limited to those tasks whose solutions require using configural cues.
23
23 Mobbs et al. (2004) conclude however that their findings are consistent with Karmiloff-Smith's claim on the grounds that activation in the occipital cortex, which is said to be involved in configural processing, is weaker in people with Williams syndrome than in controls. This argument is however unsound because the fact that people with
Williams syndrome cannot use one of the cues available to recognize faces (which would Second, Karmiloff-Smith might reject my proposal about how to individuate systems. She could instead propose that two token systems for doing x are of different types when they process some cue differently. There are however several reasons to resist this proposal. If it were applied to artifacts, slightly broken artifacts would be of a different type than non-broken artifacts. In addition, people probably process cues slightly differently because of sheer individual variation. As a result, the proposal examined here would seem to entail that their cognitive architecture would be made up of different types of systems. Alternatively, Karmiloff-Smith could propose that two token systems for doing x are of different types when they process the most important cue for doing x differently, adding that configural cues are the most important cues for face recognition. There are also several reasons to resist this alternative proposal. It is unclear how to evaluate the importance of a cue. In addition, assuming we had evaluation criteria, it is unclear why configural cues would be more important than holistic cues for face recognition.
Conclusion
Dissociations resulting from developmental psychopathologies have played an important role for supporting or undermining the main hypotheses about the typical cognitive architecture, such as evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis. If
Karmiloff-Smith were right, our confidence in these hypotheses would have to be reevaluated. Fortunately, her argument against the use of developmental psychopathologies to study the typical cognitive architecture fails. Because biological development is often modular, it is unclear whether we should expect developmental psychopathologies to affect every aspect of our mental life. Furthermore, supposing they do, if developmental psychopathologies result in more or less impaired versions of the systems that make up the typical cognitive architecture, the resulting impure dissociations would be an appropriate source of evidence for identifying the components of the typical explain the lower activation of the occipital cortex) does not mean that they use a different system (rather than an impaired version of the typical system).
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cognitive architecture. Impure dissociations would not be an appropriate source of evidence only if developmental psychopathologies resulted in systems that differ in kind from the systems making up the typical cognitive architecture. However, the empirical evidence most often discussed by Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues-individuals with Williams syndrome's alleged incapacity to use configural cues in face recognition-fails to support this strong claim. Abnormal development might affect many (perhaps all) cognitive systems, but it does not produce different kinds of systems.
